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The United States Government has pledged over$100 billion for rebuilding New Orleans and the
Gulf coast region, following the terrible but predictable
tragedy caused by Hurricane Katrina, estimated to be the
largest natural disaster in US history (Figures 1 and 2).
Billions more will go towards the restoration of the
Mississippi delta. While some have argued that it does
not make sense to rebuild New Orleans at all, given its
highly vulnerable location (eg Kusky 2005), others have
raised questions about how the city and region should be
restored (Bohannon and Enserink 2005; Boesch et al.
2006). It is clear that enormous public resources are going
to be spent and some form of rebuilding is going to occur,
not least of all because the Mississippi River in the New
Orleans region is home to the largest port in the nation
and up to one-third of the nation's oil and gas is either
generated or shipped through the north central Gulf. So
the real question is not if but how the city should be
rebuilt. There are two broad options: (1) essentially
replace what was there before, or (2) use this tragedy as
an opportunity to create something substantially different
and better.
Option 1 seems to be largely the direction being taken so
far. The Army Corps of Engineers has been actively work-
ing to rebuild the levees to their pre-storm status of being
able to withstand a Category 3 hurricane. There is discus-
sion of rebuilding all of the levees to withstand a Category
5 hurricane and even of building a Category 5 levee system
across most of the Louisiana coast. However, there is
already serious doubt as to whether a rapidly reconstructed
levee will provide the needed protection (van Herndeen
2006); even if the rebuilding is successful, it will merely be
setting up the pins to be knocked down again by a future,
even larger hurricane. In addition, the increasing cost of
energy will probably make such a levee system unsustain-
able. In the meantime, the city of New Orleans faces a
combination of worsening problems, including: (1) likely
more intense tropical storms due to global warming
(Emanuel 2005; Webster et al. 2005; Hoyos et al. 2006); (2)
continued land subsidence and sea level rise, albeit at a
slower pace than in the past (Dixon et al. 2006); and (3)
ongoing destruction of the coastal wetlands that serve as
the city’s storm protection barrier (in addition to the
many other ecosystem services they provide). 
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A new vision for New Orleans and the
Mississippi delta: applying ecological
economics and ecological engineering
Robert Costanza1*, William J Mitsch2, and John W Day Jr3
The restoration of New Orleans and the rest of the Mississippi delta after Hurricane Katrina can become another
disaster waiting to happen, or it can become a model of sustainable development. Sea level is rising, precipita-
tion patterns are changing, hurricane intensity is increasing, energy costs are predicted to soar, and the city is
continuing to sink. Most of New Orleans is currently from 0.6 to 5 m (2–15 feet) below sea level. The conven-
tional approach of simply rebuilding the levees and the city behind them will only delay the inevitable. If New
Orleans, and the delta in which it is located, can develop and pursue a new paradigm, it could be a truly unique,
sustainable, and desirable city, and an inspiration to people around the world. This paper discusses the under-
lying causes and implications of the Katrina disaster, basic goals for a sustainable redevelopment initiative, and
seven principles necessary for a sustainable vision for the future of New Orleans and the Mississippi delta.   
Front Ecol Environ 2006; 4(9): 465–472
In a nutshell:
• While it is feasible to rebuild New Orleans to its former design,
this is neither sustainable nor desirable
• What is required is a new vision of what the city could look like
and how it could function in partnership with the surrounding
delta, rather than in opposition to it
• Rebuilding New Orleans and the delta is a huge opportunity to
put sustainability into practice and substantially improve the
quality of life of all its residents
• The rebuilding must take into consideration global trends in
climate change and energy scarcity
• To frame and achieve the new vision means moving away from
conventional approaches to economics and engineering and
towards the application of ideas from broader, more transdisci-
plinary fields such as ecological economics and engineering 
1Gund Institute for Ecological Economics, Rubenstein School of
Environment and Natural Resources, University of Vermont,
Burlington, VT 05405 *(robert.costanza@uvm.edu); 2Wilma H
Schiermeier Olentangy River Wetland Research Park, The School of
Environment and Natural Resources, Ohio State University,
Columbus, OH 43202; 3Department of Oceanography and Coastal
Sciences, School of the Coast and Environment, Louisiana State
University, Baton Rouge, LA 70803
Option 2 seems to be the only viable and sustainable
option, but it has so far received little serious attention.
Our goal here is to elaborate on a substantially different
vision of a truly new New Orleans – one that can provide
a sustainable and high quality of life for all of its citizens,
while working in partnership with (not in opposition to)
the natural forces that shaped it. This New Orleans can
also serve more generally as a model for sustainable
development.
What happened in New Orleans?
The devastation of New Orleans by a major hurricane
was, unfortunately, both predictable and predicted. A
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large number of reports in both the academic
and popular press, including a special section in
the New Orleans Times-Picayune (June 23–27,
2002), a National Public Radio series in
October 2003, and an article in Scientific
American (Fischetti 2001), depicted possible
scenarios very close to what actually happened.
While the immediate reaction to massive
flooding caused by the levee breeching showed
an apparent lack of disaster planning, the hurri-
cane damage itself could only have been pre-
vented by actions taken years in advance. It
was clear from studies published in the past 50
years that New Orleans was becoming more
vulnerable with each passing year. The wet-
lands surrounding New Orleans provide protec-
tion from storm surges. These wetlands, the
result of 6 millennia of land building, have
been lost at an average rate of 65 km2 (~25 mi2)
per year since the turn of the century
(Figure 3). The barrier islands are rapidly erod-
ing as well. Almost 5000 km2 (1800 mi2) of coastal wet-
lands have been lost since the 1930s, and the situation has
continued to deteriorate. Figure 4 shows the loss of coastal
wetlands projected to occur by the year 2050. This fore-
cast was made before Hurricane Katrina, and 100% of the
projected loss actually occurred during the storm.
The cause of this dramatic land loss was a combination
of natural and human forces. For millennia, the natural
process of geologic subsidence was counterbalanced by
riverine inputs into a deltaic plain characterized by nat-
ural hydrology. However, in the 19th and 20th centuries,
there was a massive disruption of the hydrology of the
delta. Riverine input was drastically reduced by the cre-
ation of levees and the closure of distributaries, and the
internal hydrology of the delta were perva-
sively altered, mainly due to canal dredging for
oil and gas exploration and extraction (Day et
al. 2000). As a result, the blanket of freshwater,
sediments, and nutrients from the Mississippi
River basin that used to spread across the delta
is no longer there. The heavily managed
Mississippi River was forced to dump most of
its load off the continental shelf into the deep
waters of the Gulf of Mexico and the wetlands
deteriorated due to canal dredging, subsidence,
and salt water intrusion. Not only do the sedi-
ments from the Mississippi River help build
coastal marshes, but the freshwater from the
river counteracts salt water intrusion, the
inflow of nutrients spurs organic soil formation
(the major way that new soil is formed in the
delta), and iron from the river precipitates
toxic sulfides (Delaune et al. 2003; Delaune
and Pezeshki 2003). 
The Atchafalaya River, a branch of the
Mississippi that now carries one-third of the
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Figure 1. Track of Hurricane Katrina, 23–29 August 2005, showing spatial
extent and storm intensity along its path.
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Figure 2. Picture taken by an automatic camera at an electrical generating
facility located on the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway (GIWW), where the
Route I-510 bridge crosses the GIWW. This is close to where the Mississippi
River Gulf Outlet enters the GIWW. The photo clearly shows the storm
surge, estimated to be 5.5–6 m (18–20 ft.) in height.
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Mississippi’s flow, discharges into shallow
waters of the delta and has both built new
deltaic lands and protected a large area of
existing wetlands along the central
Louisiana coast (Costanza et al. 1990; Day
et al. 2000). The history of the
Atchafalaya delta shows that appropri-
ately managed river discharges and hydro-
logic restoration (by removing canal spoil
banks) can result in net marsh creation
and counteract the forces of land loss. 
The mainstem Mississippi River was
managed to allow deepwater shipping
and commerce throughout the Missis-
sippi basin and to impede flooding of
developed areas. This management
regime ultimately led to the situation
that made New Orleans so vulnerable.
The net result has been that the people
who lived below sea level in New Orleans
were in more danger every year from: (1)
the potential for river flooding; (2) the
disappearance of surrounding wetlands
due to both restriction of river input and internal hydro-
logical alterations; and (3) the deteriorating levees,
which were under continued strain due to age and
increasing hydrologic demands. Thus, what happened in
New Orleans, while a terrible “natural” disaster, was also
the cumulative result of excessive and inappropriate
management of the Mississippi River and delta, inade-
quate emergency preparation, a failure to act in time on
plans to restore the wetlands and storm protection levees,
and the expansion of the city into increasingly vulnerable
areas. Many of the areas that are now below sea level
(Figure 5) were not always so. Up until the first quarter of
the 20th century, most of the city was above sea level,
either on the natural levee of the river or
on older ridges formed by earlier courses of
the river. However, the drainage of the wet-
lands between the natural levee along the
Mississippi River and Lake Pontchartrain
promoted soil oxidation and rapid subsi-
dence (Figure 6) in many parts of the city.
Recent engineering reviews of the levee
systems have identified design and con-
struction flaws that may have contributed
to their failure (Warrick and Whoriskey
2006). It is now uncertain whether
rebuilding the levees to their former design
would even protect the city from a
Category 2 hurricane. Ivor van Heerden,
leader of a Louisiana-appointed team of
engineers, is quoted by Warrick and
Whoriskey (2006) as saying, “When asked,
we have constantly urged anyone returning
to New Orleans to exercise caution,
because the system now in place could fail
in a Category 2 storm. It has already failed during a fast-
moving Category 3 storm that missed New Orleans by 30
miles.”
 The restoration plan that never happened
A plan called the Louisiana Coastal Area (LCA) project
(USACE 2004; Orth et al. 2005) would have slowed the
trend of continuing wetland loss. Implementation of the
plan was just beginning when Hurricane Katrina struck in
August 2005. While some of the plan called for conven-
tional engineering approaches (ie for barrier island
restoration) a major element of the project also fit the
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Figure 3. History of coastal Louisiana wetland gain and loss over the last 6000
years, showing historical net rates of gain of approximately 3 km2 yr–1 over the
period from 6000 years ago until about 100 years ago, followed by a net loss of
approximately 65 km2 yr–1 since then.
Figure 4. Projected wetland loss by 2050 in coastal Louisiana. An estimated
100% of this projected loss occurred during Hurricane Katrina.
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concept of ecological engineering, defined as the design
of sustainable ecosystems that integrate human society
with its natural environment for the benefit of both
(Mitsch 1993, 1996, 1998; Mitsch and Jørgensen 2004).
Some ecological engineering projects that were planned
as part of the LCA were river diversions designed to rein-
troduce river water to delta wetlands (Mitsch and
Jørgensen 2004). These diversions could also contribute,
along with many similar actions throughout the basin, to
a reduced hypoxic “dead zone” in the Gulf of Mexico
(Mitsch et al. 2001, 2005; Day et al., 2005). While the
LCA plan was not sufficient to reverse coastal wetland
loss, it was a step in the right direction. 
Plans to restore coastal wetlands may
now be in jeopardy as priorities shift to
civil engineering solutions such as levees
and pumps. The estimated $14 billion that
was needed for this “natural engineering”
may well be swallowed up by the recon-
struction of the city to its former design
and by a storm protection scheme for most
of the Louisiana coast. Perhaps most
importantly, from the standpoint of sus-
tainability, the rebuilding of the city’s
hydrologic defenses is occurring when
conventional energy sources are less avail-
able and more costly (Campbell and
Laherrere 1988; Roberts 2004).
It is ironic that Louisiana and the rest of
coastal America will probably be sub-
jected to increased storm intensity and sea
level rise due to a combination of climate
change (partly the result of the burning of
fossil fuels, a large fraction of which came from coastal
Louisiana) and a degraded coastline, some of which is due
to oil and gas exploration activity.
Why restore wetlands to protect New Orleans?
Increasing the area of coastal wetlands through ecological
engineering provides a very cost-effective and sustainable
approach for providing hurricane protection to human
settlements in coastal Louisiana. Wetlands will provide an
important and sustainable buffer against storm surges and
wave action generated by tropical storms and hurricanes.
Coastal ecosystems such as marshes and forested wetlands,
whether naturally occurring or ecologi-
cally engineered, play a significant role in
reducing the influence of hurricanes and
even tsunami waves (Farber 1987; Mitsch
and Gosselink 2000; Danielsen et al.
2005). The mechanisms involved include
decreasing the area of open water (fetch)
for wind to form waves, increasing drag on
water motion and hence the amplitude of
a storm surge, reducing direct wind effect
on the water surface, and directly absorb-
ing wave energy (Boesch et al. 2006).
While few experimental studies or
modeling efforts have specifically
addressed the effect of coastal marshes on
storm surges, anecdotal data accumulated
in Louisiana after Hurricane Andrew in
1992 suggested that storm surge was
reduced about 4.7 cm km–1 of marsh
(3 in mile–1 of marsh; Louisiana Coastal
Wetlands Conservation Task Force and
Wetlands Conservation and Restoration
Authority 1998). Extrapolating from this
number, a storm tracking from the south
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Figure 5. Map of areas flooded and flooding depths in New Orleans after Katrina.
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Figure 6. Photo of a house in the Lakeview area near the University of New
Orleans, showing the depth of flooding in this area. After the levees broke, the water
level was at sea level, showing the depth of subsidence due to soil oxidation after
drainage of the organic wetland soils in this area.
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of New Orleans through existing coastal marshes could
have its surge reduced by 3.66 m (12 feet) if it crossed 80
km (50 miles) of marsh before reaching the city.
Since marsh plants hold and accrete sediments
(Cahoon et al. 1995), often reduce sediment resuspension
(Harter and Mitsch 2003), and consequently maintain
shallow water depths, the presence of vegetation con-
tributes in two ways: first by actually decreasing surges
and waves and second by maintaining the shallow depths
that have the same effect. Because wetlands indicate
shallow water, the presence of wetland vegetation is also
an “indicator” of the degree to which New Orleans and
other human settlements are protected. 
 The goal for restoring New Orleans
Before discussing options for restoring New Orleans, we
need to consider what we are trying to restore and why.
The conventional approach to economic development
focuses only on the market economy – the value of those
goods and services that are exchanged for money. The
purpose is usually taken to be to maximize the value of
these goods and services – with the assumption that the
more activity, the better off we are. Thus, the more GDP
(which measures aggregate activity in the market econ-
omy), the better. However, the purpose of the regional
economy should be broader – to provide for the sustain-
able well-being of people. That goal encompasses material
well-being, certainly, but also anything else that affects
well-being and its sustainability (Costanza et al. 1997a). 
There is a substantial amount of new research that
demonstrates the limits of conventional economic income
and consumption in contributing to well-being (Easterlin
2003; Kasser 2003; Layard 2005). Easterlin (2003) has
shown that well-being tends to correlate well with health,
level of education, and marital status, and with income only
up to a fairly low threshold of “enough”, concluding that,
“…most individuals spend a disproportionate
amount of their lives working to make money,
and sacrifice family life and health, domains in
which aspirations remain fairly constant as
actual circumstances change, and where the
attainment of one’s goals has a more lasting
impact on happiness. Hence, a reallocation of
time in favor of family life and health would, on
average, increase individual happiness.”
Layard (2005) points out that current economic policies
are not improving happiness and that, “happiness should
become the goal of policy, and the progress of national
happiness should be measured and analyzed as closely as
the growth of GNP”. 
There is also growing evidence that ecological systems
produce a range of services that support human well-being
(Costanza et al. 1997b; Daily 1997; Millennium Ecosystem
Assessement 2005; National Research Council 2005;
Farber et al. 2006). Ecosystem services occur at many
scales, from climate regulation at the global scale, to flood
and storm protection, soil formation, fisheries, nutrient
cycling, recreation, and aesthetic services at the local and
regional scales. It has been estimated that the annual non-
market value of the Earth’s ecosystem services is a great
deal larger than global GDP (Costanza et al. 1997b;
Boumans et al. 2002; Patterson 2002). 
So if we want to assess the “real” economy – all the
things which contribute to real, sustainable, human well-
being – as opposed to only the “market” economy, we
have to measure the non-marketed contributions to
human well-being from nature, from family, friends, and
other social relationships, at many scales, as well as from
health and education. One convenient way to summarize
these contributions is to group them into four basic types
of capital that are necessary to support the real, human
well-being-producing economy: built capital, human cap-
ital, social capital, and natural capital. 
Coastal wetlands in Louisiana have been estimated to pro-
vide $940 ha–1 yr–1 ($375 ac–1 yr–1 – these and all subsequent
figures have been converted to 2004 US dollars) in storm and
flood protection services (Costanza et al. 1989; Panel 1).
Restoring Louisiana’s coastal wetlands and New Orleans’ lev-
ees has been estimated to cost about $25 billion. Had the
original wetlands and other natural features, such as barrier
islands and natural ridges, been intact and the levees in better
shape, a substantial portion of the $100 billion plus damages
from this hurricane would have been avoided. Prevention
would have been much cheaper and more effective than
reconstruction. In addition, the coastal wetlands provide
other ecosystem services which, when added to the storm pro-
tection services, are estimated to be worth about $12 700 ha–1
yr–1 ($5200 ac–1 yr–1; Costanza et al. 1997b). Restoring the
4800 km2 (480 000 ha) of wetlands lost prior to Katrina would
thus restore $6 billion yr–1 in lost ecosystem services, or $200
billion in present value (at a 3% discount rate).
What has been done so far?
New Orleans mayor Ray Nagin established the “Bring
New Orleans Back” (BNOB) commission shortly after
Hurricane Katrina, to develop and implement plans for
rebuilding and repopulating the city. The Urban
Planning Committee released its final report on January
11, 2006 (Bring New Orleans Back Commission 2006).
They begin with a vision for the city:
“New Orleans will be a sustainable, environ-
mentally safe, socially equitable community with
a vibrant economy. Its neighborhoods will be
planned with its citizens and connect to jobs and
the region. Each will preserve and celebrate its
heritage of culture, landscape, and architecture.”
This vision is consistent with the ideas about the compo-
nents of quality of life and the importance of natural,
469
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social, human, and built capital elaborated in the previ-
ous section. To achieve this vision, the commission rec-
ommended a city-wide framework for reconstruction,
consisting of four elements:
• A Flood and Stormwater Protection plan, including
perimeter levees, pumping and gates, internal levees
with separate pumps, and coastal wetland restoration.
• A Transit and Transportation plan, including city-wide
high speed light rail with links to the airport, Baton
Rouge, and the Gulf coast, and more emphasis on bicy-
cles and pedestrian traffic.
• A Parks and Open Space plan, including multi-func-
tion parks that are also part of the internal stormwater
management system that includes water cleansing.
• A Neighborhood Rebuilding plan, based on neighbor-
hood centers that provide a high quality of daily life.
The BNOB Commission was the result of a broadly par-
ticipatory process and represents a good start on the
process of envisioning and creating a sustainable and
desirable New Orleans. Nevertheless, the process and
recommendations need to continue a great deal further. 
A second set of recommendations (Boesch et al. 2006)
called for levees to protect human settlements, including
New Orleans, coupled with restoration of the coastal
marshes and other wetlands. It concluded that planning,
investment, and management decisions in coastal
Louisiana needed to recognize the forces of nature and
the values of natural capital in addition to the protection
of life, property, and communities. It also concluded that
an effective storm protection system is not possible with-
out coastal restoration.
 Seven principals for the restoration of New
Orleans and coastal Louisiana
The natural, built, human, and social capital assets of
New Orleans have been radically depleted and need to be
rebuilt. We can recreate the vulnerable and unsustainable
city that was there before, or we can reinvent New
Orleans as a new model of a sustainable and desirable city
of the future. To do this we need to redesign and restore
not only the built infrastructure, but also the social,
human, and natural capital of the region. How do we do
this and what would a truly sustainable and desirable New
Orleans look like? Certainly, the broad outlines of the
BNOB commission report and the Boesch et al. (2006)
report are good starting points. Here are some additional
elements of a truly sustainable vision, based on ecological
engineering and economics, that extend and amplify
those recommendations (Costanza et al. 2006): 
(1) Let the water decide. Building a city below sea level is
always a dangerous proposition. While parts of New
Orleans are still at or above sea level, much of it has
sunk well below since the first quarter of the 20th
century. It is not sustainable or desirable to rebuild
these areas in the same way they were before. They
should either be replaced with wetlands that are
allowed to trap sediments to rebuild the land (see
below), or replaced with buildings that are adapted to
occasional flooding (ie on pilings or floats or with
non-essential items on lower levels; Figure 7).
Wetlands inside the levees can help clean waters,
store short-term flood waters, provide habitat for
wildlife, and become an amenity for the city. 
(2) Avoid abrupt boundaries between deepwater systems
and uplands. Gentle slopes with barrier islands, shallow
waterbodies, wetlands, and natural ridges are the best
division, and avoid putting humans, particularly those
who have few resources to avoid hydrologic disasters, in
harm’s way. The abrupt boundaries of the levees are nec-
essary, since natural features such as wetlands and barrier
islands alone cannot protect the city, but we need to use
both, as appropriate. The idea of avoiding abrupt bound-
aries is included in the idea of multiple lines of defense,
where all of these features are integrated into a compre-
hensive flood protection system (Lopez 2006)
(3) Restore natural capital. A healthy economy requires a
balance of built, human, social, and natural capital.
Because of its enormous size (about 25 000 km2) and
productivity, the Mississippi delta is perhaps the most
concentrated area of natural capital in North
America. This is reflected in the largest fishery and
most important flyway terminus in the US, abundant
fish and wildlife, high water cleansing ability, and
high storm protection services. As discussed earlier,
restoring the 4800 km2 of wetlands lost prior to
Katrina would provide a host of valuable ecosystem
services, worth roughly $6 billion yr–1, or $200 billion
in present value (at a 3% discount rate). 
(4) To do this we should use the resources of the Mississippi
River to rebuild the coast, changing the current system
that constrains the river between levees. Diversions of
water, nutrients, and sediments, such as those envi-
sioned in the LCA plan, should be greatly expanded in
order to allow more rapid restoration of the coastal wet-
lands. Levees are necessary in some locations, but where
possible the levees should be breeched by structures in a
controlled way, to allow marsh rebuilding. Reopening
old distributaries and allowing crevasse formation are
470
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Panel 1. Storm protection value provided by coastal
wetlands
The value of coastal wetlands for storm protection is obviously
related to the amount and pattern of built capital that the wet-
lands are protecting. The design of coastal wetland restoration
projects must take this into account in determining the most
critical wetlands to restore. If New Orleans were partly or fully
abandoned, the storm protection value of the wetlands would
decrease accordingly. It is also true that there is an inverse cor-
relation between the total area of coastal wetlands and their
storm protection value per unit area. The fewer wetlands
remaining, the higher their value per unit area.
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two additional ways to reconnect
the river to the deltaic plain. The
reconnection of the river should
be integrated with other features,
such as barrier island restoration,
wise use of dredged sediments,
and extensive canal and spoil
bank removal, to develop a com-
prehensive restoration plan.
Other restoration resources, such
as treated municipal effluent and
upland runoff, should also be used
(eg Day et al. 2004).
(5) Restore the built capital of New
Orleans to the highest standards
of high-performance green
buildings and a car-limited
urban environment, with high
mobility for everyone. New
Orleans has abundant renewable
energy sources in the form of
sun, wind, and water. The
energy issue is absent from the
BNOB commission report, but is critical for any
design claiming to be sustainable. What better mes-
sage than to build a 21st century sustainable city, run-
ning on renewable energy, on the rubble of a 20th
century oil and gas production hub. 
(6) Rebuild the social capital of New Orleans to 21st cen-
tury standards of diversity, tolerance, fairness, and jus-
tice. New Orleans has suffered long enough with
social capital dating from the 18th (or even the 15th)
century. To do this the planning and implementation
of the rebuilding must maximize participation by the
entire community. This will certainly be difficult for a
number of reasons, including the historical
antecedents of racism and classism in the region, and
the fact that much of the population has been forcibly
removed from the city (Cutter et al. 2003). Yet it is
absolutely essential if the goals of a sustainable and
desirable future are to be achieved. The BNOB com-
mission has made a good start in the direction of
broad participation, but much more needs to be done.
(7) Finally, we should restore the Mississippi River Basin
to minimize coastal pollution and the threats of river
flooding in New Orleans. Upstream changes in the
3 million km2 Mississippi drainage basin have substan-
tially changed nutrient and sediment delivery patterns
to the delta. Changes in farming practices in the
drainage basin can improve not only the coastal
restoration process, but also improve the nation’s agri-
cultural economy by promoting sustainable farming
practices in the entire basin (Mitsch et al. 2001;
Mitsch and Day 2006).
The restoration of New Orleans and the rest of the
Mississippi delta can become another expensive disaster
waiting to happen, or it can become a model of sustainable
development. If it is the latter, it could be a truly unique
inspiration to billions of people around the world. What
better way to say to the world “look at what can be accom-
plished” than to create a sustainable and desirable city,
shining like a jewel on the Mississippi, where all the street-
cars run on renewable energy and are named “Desirable”.
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